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Original Article
The scene is familiar. Donald Trump stands at the podium 
leading a political rally. In a theatrical performance, he holds 
court for an hour or two. Hands waving and his rhetoric pep-
pered with terms such as “many people say,” “huge,” “fake,” 
and “vicious” (always toward him!), he excoriates his liberal 
enemies and incites the crowd. They applaud wildly and, at 
times, break out into chants such as “Lock her up” and “Send 
them back.” After his defeat in the 2020 presidential election, 
the slogans now include “Stop the steal” (AP Reporter 2020).
The backdrop behind him is instructive. No, there is no 
set of American flags or a Trump-Pence banner arranged 
from one side of the stage to the other. Rather, a slice of the 
audience has been strategically selected to sit behind the 
president—happily cheering at every opportunity. They 
send a message. First, they are all white—with the possible 
exception of the single onlooker holding up a “Blacks for 
Trump” sign. This anomalous image only makes the white-
ness of the occasion more poignant (Givhan 2019). The 
president’s expressions of racial and ethnic animus are regu-
larly featured and applauded (Fording and Schram 2020; 
Kulig et al. forthcoming; O’Connor and Marans 2018).
Second, the members of the backdrop crowd are almost 
all wearing bright red MAGA (Make America Great Again) 
hats—as Trump, dressed in an expensive suit and tie, often 
does himself (Herrman 2020). Hats are a sign of intense loy-
alty, whether it is a Yankees hat, a university hat, or a Trump 
hat. They are a public expression of identity—a proud 
announcement of allegiance (Crane 2012; see also Givhan 
2019). For supporters, donning a MAGA hat expresses spe-
cial affection for the president—a form of identity fusion 
(see Kunst, Dovidio, and Thomsen 2019). For critics, the hat 
has become a “provocation”: “a symbol of us vs. them, of 
exclusion and suspicion, of garrulous narcissism, of white 
male privilege, of violence and hate” (Givhan 2019; see also 
Barlow 2019). Indeed, then president-elect Joe Biden felt the 
need to respond to “a half-decade of domed messaging to 
troll Trump with a hat of his own” (Wolf 2020). In a rejoinder 
to “Make America Great Again,” Biden’s hat carried the 
rebuttal slogan “We Just Did” (Wolf 2020). At least a million 
customers have purchased an official MAGA hat (Brennan 
2019), available for $30 on the Trump Web site (https://shop.
donaldjtrump.com/collections/headwear). At a reduced 
price, thousands more unauthorized MAGA hats have been 
sold on Amazon and on Chinese e-commerce portals (Chen 
2020; Herrman 2020). Who are these people who put on the 
MAGA hats? Who are these people who have intense faith in 
Donald Trump and believe that he will “make American 
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Abstract
On the basis of a 2019 YouGov survey of white respondents (n = 734), the impact of racial beliefs on support for 
Donald Trump was explored. The analysis revealed that in addition to racial resentment, white nationalism—a desire 
to keep the United States white demographically and culturally—was strongly related to faith in Trump. Analyses based 
on a 2019 Amazon Mechanical Turk survey yielded similar results and also showed that white nationalism increased 
willingness to wear a MAGA hat. Future research on the political consequences of racial beliefs should focus on what 
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great again”? In this article, we seek to address this 
question.
Trump communicates a unique message: he is strong; his 
opponents are weak. He understands and has a special capac-
ity to protect his flock against the threats they face. He alone 
can make American great again, restoring the nation to a 
place where good, patriotic citizens are valued and not called 
a “basket of deplorables” (Reilly 2016). Those embracing 
this message have a deep allegiance to the man, not necessar-
ily a specific ideology (Barber and Pope 2019). Their faith in 
Trump is consequential. The Republican Party platform 
should be anything Trump says it is. More than this, such 
faith inoculates Trump against any criticism: impeachments, 
repeated lies, accusations of sexual misconduct, corruption 
in his administration and pardoning criminal associates, 
attacks on previously treasured institutions such as the 
Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, the embrace of Vladimir Putin and other 
authoritarian rulers, knowingly misleading the public about 
wearing masks and the dangers of a pandemic whose death 
toll exceeds 430,000, false claims about the 2020 election 
being stolen, and best-selling exposés alleging that he is unfit 
for the presidency (see, e.g., Cohen 2020; Rucker and 
Leonnig 2020; Woodward 2020). Although a touch hyper-
bolic, Trump captured the loyalty of his audience at an Iowa 
campaign rally when he stated, “I could stand in the middle 
of Fifth Avenue and shoot somebody, and I wouldn’t lose any 
voters, OK? It’s, like, incredible” (Dwyer 2016).
Various explanations have been offered for this expres-
sion of faith in Trump. Given the whiteness of his support-
ers—whether in crowds or in the voting booth—and his 
frequent anti–minority group rhetoric, a common view is that 
Trump draws his support from those harboring racial animus. 
Like other Republicans before him, he is portrayed simply as 
“playing the race card” (Maxwell and Shields 2019). An 
alternative perspective is that the president’s unique appeal 
rests on his affirmation of whites’ in-group racial identity and 
legitimation of the desire to keep the nation culturally and 
demographically white (see, e.g., Jardina 2019b; Kaufmann 
2019). The reference is to widespread attitudes in society and 
not to membership in a white supremacy group (Jardina 
2019a, 2019b; Kaufmann 2019). Out-group racial animus 
and in-group racial solidarity are thus seen as analytically, if 
not substantively, distinct. As Kaufmann (2019) noted, “the 
common view that white identity leads to dislike of minori-
ties is misplaced” (p. 128).
In this context, in the present project, we explore the rela-
tionship between racial beliefs and support for President 
Trump. Specifically, the focus is on the connection between 
belief in white nationalism and faith in Trump, controlling 
for a standard measure of racial resentment (Kinder and 
Sanders 1996) and a new measure of racial sympathy 
(Chudy 2017, 2021). Controls also are introduced for other 
explanations that might account for Trump’s appeal: mem-
bership in his base electorate, political allegiance 
(Republican, conservative ideology), and fear (of crime and 
of a chaotic world).
Racial Beliefs and Faith in Trump
Unpacking Racial Beliefs
Research surrounding racial beliefs has transitioned from 
traditional, overt racism in which blacks are seen as biologi-
cally and socially inferior, to “symbolic” or “laissez-faire” 
racism, in which blacks’ disadvantaged state is attributed to 
individual failings, and their receipt of government assis-
tance is judged as special treatment (Bobo, Kluegel, and 
Smith 1997; Henry and Sears 2002). Kinder and Sanders 
(1996) defined this construct as “racial resentment” and 
developed a scale that is now the field’s standard measure. 
Extensive research shows that racial resentment is a robust 
predictor of a range of social policy preferences (Cramer 
2020; Unnever, Cullen, and Jonson 2008). In fact, the failure 
to include racial resentment in policy analyses would risk 
omitted variable bias.
Recently, however, attempts have been made to unpack 
racial beliefs into different components and to explore their 
consequences. Two important advances merit attention. 
First, “defined as white distress over black suffering,” 
Chudy (2021:123) showed that “racial sympathy” differs 
from racial resentment and is related significantly to public 
policy preferences, such as government support for blacks, 
increased federal spending on welfare programs, and gov-
ernment subsidies for black businesses. She contended that 
positive racial attitudes can lead whites to endorse policies 
beneficial to African Americans. At issue is whether those 
with racial sympathy are less likely to look favorably upon 
Donald Trump.
Second, in light of the trends in growing demographic 
diversity creating a number of majority-minority states 
(Jardina 2019b, Jones 2016), scholars are focusing on what 
whites think not only about blacks but also about themselves, 
with attention paid to the influence of constructs such as 
white identity and consciousness (Jardina 2019b). Our inter-
est is on what Kaufmann (2019) termed white “ethno-tradi-
tional nationalism,” also known as “white nationalism.” This 
is the “desire to limit change to the ethnic composition of the 
nation” (Kaufmann 2019:515), that is, to keep America a 
majority white nation. The essential point is that although 
modestly correlated, white nationalism is distinct conceptu-
ally and empirically from racial animus (Jardina 2019a, 
Kaufmann 2019), a relationship we show ahead. When 
nationalism and animus merge—and include views of black 
inferiority and racial hierarchy—they foster white suprem-
acy. Still, the independent effects of white nationalism and 
racial resentment should be assessed. As noted later, both of 
these factors matter in expressions of faith in Trump.
Five key characteristics define white nationalism and 
the goal to keep the United States a white nation 
Graham et al. 3
demographically and culturally. First, those holding white 
nationalistic beliefs view being white as part of their social 
identity, much in the same way being black or Hispanic is 
part of an individual’s social identity (Jardina 2019a; 
Kaufmann 2019). Second, they wish to maintain “the ethnic 
majority as an important component of the nation alongside 
other groups” (Kaufmann 2019:11; Swain 2001). This iden-
tity as part of the white ethnic majority and its symbols are 
highly valued. Third, they favor slower immigration, as 
opposed to outright rejection of immigration, to “permit 
enough immigrants to voluntarily assimilate into the ethnic 
majority,” which is critical to maintaining white ethno-tradi-
tionalism  (Kaufmann 2019:11). Fourth, related to immigra-
tion, they are concerned about “the potential [immigration 
has] to transform societies,” which places their ethnic major-
ity at risk (Kaufmann 2019:515). Fifth, those holding white 
nationalistic views do not inherently also hold views of racial 
animus or prejudice (i.e., white supremacy) (Taub 2016). 
They deeply resent this stigmatization (Hochschild 2016; 
Kaufmann 2019; Scott 2019). Again, they wish to “secure 
their multi-generational group attachments and identity ref-
erence points for posterity” (Kaufmann 2019:69).
Just to be clear, we decided to use the term white national-
ism only after much deliberation. Our initial reluctance was 
because this phrase is at times used interchangeably in public 
and academic discourse with white supremacy. We have 
been careful to distinguish between the two constructs. We 
settled on white nationalism, however, because it captures 
the essence of the belief being measured: a preference for a 
nation that is culturally and demographically white (see 
Kulig et al. 2020). (Note that this is similar to “white 
Christian nationalism”; see Davis and Perry forthcoming; 
Whitehead, Perry, and Baker 2018.) Terms such as in-group 
solidarity–out-group hostility and ethno-traditional nation-
alism have merit and arguably could be used as alternatives 
(see, e.g., Fording and Schram 2020; Kaufmann 2019). Still, 
this language fails to convey descriptively the core theme 
being investigated: how whites think about the racial status 
of their nation at this historical juncture. White nationalism 
succeeds in this regard.
Consequences of Racial Beliefs
According to Jardina (forthcoming), the dominant paradigm 
in the study of electoral politics has been to “dismiss the 
study of in-group attitudes and identities among white 
Americans, focusing instead on whites’ out-group attitudes 
in the form of racial prejudice or racial resentment” (p. 3). 
Her work on white identity politics challenges this view as 
overly narrow. Beyond racial animus, observed Jardina 
(forthcoming), “some whites may also be swayed by their 
desire to protect the interests of their in-group and to main-
taining their group’s power and privileges” (p. 3). As a 
result, “political candidates may be able to appeal to or acti-
vate two distinct, but arguably equally insidious, racial 
forces in contemporary electoral politics” (p. 3). Jardina 
(forthcoming) called these “in-group love and out-group 
hate” (p. 1). We argue that this revised perspective has 
implications for understanding whites’ allegiance to 
President Trump.
From the very start of his 2016 campaign, Donald Trump 
made race and ethnicity a key policy initiative, starting by 
accusing Mexican immigrants of “bringing drugs . . . bring-
ing crime . . . [and being] rapists” (Enns 2018; Washington 
Post Staff 2015). Furthermore, he proposed banning immi-
grants from Muslim-majority nations and constructing a 
wall across the southern U.S. border to “stop the drugs . . . 
shore up the border . . . [and] to get all of the drug lords” 
(Garfield 2016). Aside from his policy positions, Trump has 
used racially infused comments to describe cities such as 
Chicago and Baltimore, to support Confederate monuments 
and actors on all sides in Charlottesville, to attack athlete-
activists such as Colin Kaepernick, and to attack activist 
groups such as Black Lives Matter (BLM). Furthermore, 
Trump has promoted his appeal to whiteness by appointing 
alleged white nationalists Stephen Miller and Steve Bannon 
to key positions within his White House staff (Davis and 
Shear 2019). Ultimately, at issue is whether support for 
Trump is primarily rooted in racial resentment or in his 
appeal to white nationalism.
Although the size of the effect is in dispute (Enns 2018), 
there is a wealth of research showing that racial animus 
increased favorable ratings of and voting for Donald Trump. 
The extant studies also reveal, however, that another factor 
played a role in his primary and presidential elections: anti-
immigrant sentiments (see, e.g., Fording and Schram 2020; 
Griffin and Teixeira 2017; Hooghe and Dassonneville 2018; 
Kaufmann 2019; McElwee and McDaniel 2017; Newman, 
Shah, and Collingwood 2018; Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck 
2017). Trump’s political genius was in making immigration 
a salient issue (Kaufmann 2019). He used it not only to dero-
gate out-group members but also to signal “to whites with 
higher levels of racial solidarity that he had their group’s 
interests in mind” (Jardina forthcoming:8). As Jardina (forth-
coming) observed,
Immigration arguably poses an exceptional threat to whites’ 
dominance because it introduces foreigners with unfamiliar 
cultures and languages that may be perceived as threatening the 
nation’s dominant Anglo-Saxon traditions, and it has contributed 
to the loss of white Americans’ numerical majority. . . . Several 
scholars and pundits have argued that immigration poses a risk 
to white American culture. (p. 8, note 8)
Importantly, Jardina’s (2019b, forthcoming) empirical analy-
ses show that not only racial resentment but also white iden-
tity (the importance of being white to one’s identity) and 
white consciousness (whites cannot find a job because of 
minority hiring, whites must work together to change laws 
unfair to them) have political consequences. Using the 
(January) 2016 ANES Pilot Study, Jardina (2019b) examined 
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how racial beliefs influenced “affective evaluations of Trump 
using the 101-point feeling thermometer measures, where 
respondents are asked to rate how warm or cold they feel 
toward a particular political figure” (p. 235). Beyond the 
effects of racial resentment, white identity and consciousness 
had a substantively large effect in increasing warmth toward 
Trump. Equally instructive, compared with other 2016 pri-
mary and general election candidates, Trump was “unique in 
his appeal to racially conscious whites” (Jardina 2019b:239; 
see also Jardina forthcoming). The data also demonstrated 
that white consciousness contributed to a preference for 
Trump in the 2016 presidential vote choice (Jardina 2019b). 
“We cannot understand the rise and success of Donald 
Trump,” Jardina (2019b) concluded, “without turning our 
attention to white racial identity and consciousness” (p. 265).1
In this regard, Trump appears to have been remarkably 
effective in using racial messages to evoke white allegiance. 
Hochschild’s (2016) ethnographic study of Tea Party sup-
porters in Louisiana is revealing. She began by documenting 
how whites in bayou country feel “culturally marginalized,” 
a “besieged minority” in which “strangers [people of color] 
step ahead of you in line, making you anxious, resentful, and 
afraid” (pp. 221–22). Attending the then-candidate’s cam-
paign rally, Hochschild noted that “nearly everyone is white; 
apart from protesters, the only blacks I see are security 
guards or vendors hawking Trump T-shirts” (p. 222). 
Hochschild then described Trump’s special talent in appeal-
ing to his followers’ “emotional self-interest,” of providing 
“a giddy release from the feeling of being a stranger in one’s 
own land” (p. 228; see also Kimmel 2013; Schrock et al. 
2017). Trump derogated out-groups such as radical Muslims, 
“bad hombres” from Mexico, and blacks and women receiv-
ing unfair advantages. He promised to make America great 
again for the real majority of Americans: whites. “The cos-
tumes, hats, signs, and symbols,” observed Hochschild, 
“reaffirm this new sense unity” (p. 226). Hochschild used 
Emile Durkheim’s concept of “collective effervescence” to 
capture the excitement Trump evoked and his ability to 
“unify worshipers” (pp. 225–26). Faith in Trump ran high. 
As one “middle-aged man” commented, “To be in the pres-
ence of such a man!” (p. 224 emphasis in original).
Research Strategy
In this context, in the current project, we examine whether 
three racial beliefs are associated with faith in Donald Trump: 
racial resentment and two new constructs, racial sympathy 
and white nationalism. The term faith is used because the 
outcome is not voting preferences but the belief that the pres-
ident is a strong leader with special talents to protect the 
nation and to “make America great again.” Presented in the 
“Methods” section, a first and an important task is to show 
that the three racial beliefs are empirically distinct. This turns 
out to be the case, making further analysis possible. These 
results also constitute a unique methodological advance in 
the measurement of racial beliefs.
To assess the independent effects of racial beliefs, we pro-
pose four potential models that might predict faith in Trump. 
First, in the Trump base model, the president’s support comes 
from his political base, which includes men, Republicans, 
those living in the South, and evangelicals. Second, in the 
political model, support is derived from political values 
aligned with conservatives and antisocialist viewpoints. 
Third, in the crime salience model, support is tied to Trump’s 
ability to quell fears of crime and the perceptions of the dan-
gerousness of the world with his masculinity, bravado, and 
support for greater security (e.g., border wall). Fourth, in the 
racial model—the main focus of the study—support for 
Trump stems from his policy positions and pronouncements 
on race in American society. This perspective would propose 
that those who harbor racial animus and lack sympathy for 
black distress would endorse the president. Given the presi-
dent’s linking of whiteness to what makes American great 
and his appeal to whites’ emotional interests (Hochschild 
2016), this model would also see white nationalism as a 
robust predictor of faith in Trump.
Before proceeding, some attention needs to paid to an 
alternative approach that focuses on “white Christian nation-
alism,” including its impact on voting for Donald Trump (see 
Whitehead et al. 2018; see also Jones 2016). Research in this 
vein surveys whites about their desire for the United States to 
be a Christian nation (e.g., “The federal government should 
advocate Christian values”). Originally, the view of America 
as a “WASP” (white Anglo-Saxon Protestant) country was 
hegemonic, but eventually Christian nationalism became 
associated with conservative social and political views and 
concentrated in southern states (Jones 2016). Following 
Jardina (2019b) and Kaufmann (2019), we focus on whites’ 
preference for an in-group nation (white nationalism) sepa-
rately from religion (which we include as a control), assess-
ing their effects independently. Note that support for Trump 
is not confined to southern or red states. In fact, because of 
population density, more Trump voters (38 million of 74 mil-
lion) live in states won by Biden (Bump 2020). That said, we 
1In Hard White, Fording and Schram (2020) argued that white 
identity’s effects on support for Trump are indirect through out-
group hostility, including anti-immigrant animus. In our Amazon 
Mechanical Turk data (discussed ahead), we were able assess this 
contention by incorporating into our analysis a five-item scale mea-
suring whether immigrants crossing the U.S.-Mexican border are 
seen as hard-working and filling unwanted U.S. jobs or as likely to 
commit serious crimes and take jobs from Americans (α = .829, 
factor loadings between .716 and .848). This variable was unrelated 
to willingness to wear a MAGA hat but was significantly related to 
faith in Trump (β = .147). Still, even with anti-immigrant hostil-
ity in the model, white nationalism retained a robust direct effect 
on faith in Trump (β = .292). Our YouGov data did not contain a 
measure of anti-immigrant hostility, so this analysis could not be 
undertaken with those data.
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view research on white nationalism and on white Christian 




We use two national-level surveys designed by the research 
team: one is used for the main analysis conducted by YouGov, 
and one serves as a supplementary analysis to assess the 
robustness of effects through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
(MTurk). The first survey was placed in the field June 7 to 
10, 2019, by YouGov, an intetrnational survey company with 
a pool of more than 2 million U.S. residents who participate 
in large, opt-in panels. YouGov’s methodology includes a 
three-phase sampling strategy, which is designed to produce 
an estimated nationally representative sample of the target 
population (Rivers 2006). In the first phase, a synthetic sam-
pling frame is constructed using high-quality probability sur-
veys and large-scale, commercially available databases—in 
our case, the 2016 American Community Survey (ACS). 
Second, YouGov panel members are matched to this syn-
thetic sampling frame on the basis of several demographic 
and behavioral characteristics; in our case, 1,427 panel mem-
bers were matched on the basis of gender, age, race, and edu-
cation. Third, propensity score weighting is used to adjust 
any biases within the sample (Rivers 2006; see Thielo 2017 
for a detailed review). This methodology has been found to 
produce estimates of relational inferences that are in the 
same direction and of similar magnitude to large-scale prob-
ability-based samples (i.e., the General Social Survey) 
(Graham, Pickett, and Cullen forthcoming).
In our sample, this process led to the approximated repre-
sentative sample of 1,200 respondents. Given the focus of 
this study, only white respondents were included in this 
study, which reduced the sample to 770 respondents. Finally, 
because of missing values (<5 percent), the final analytic 
sample was 734 white respondents.2 Compared with ACS 
estimates of white Americans (in parentheses), this sample 
was 51.3 percent female (50.7 percent), 51.7 percent were 
married (52.2 percent), 44.6 percent had a college degree or 
higher (35.7 percent), 87.8 percent were registered voters 
(63.7 percent), and 38.2 percent resided in the South (35.6 
percent). Furthermore, compared with Pew Research Center 
estimates (in parentheses), 33.9 percent of this sample identi-
fied as Republican (54 percent), and 29.8 percent identified 
as evangelical Christians (25.4 percent). Finally, 38.8 per-
cent of our sample identified as politically conservative, 
compared with a Gallup estimate of 39 percent of white 
Americans.
The second survey, obtained via MTurk, was fielded in 
October 2019. Again, these data offered an opportunity to 
see if the YouGov findings with regard to racial beliefs had 
the same effects across an independent sample. This platform 
allows “workers” to select from and complete different tasks 
for a small financial incentive—$3.38 for completing our 
survey. The use of these opt-in surveys provides the benefits 
of reducing satisficing, interviewer effects, and measurement 
error (Chang and Krosnick 2009). To recruit high-quality 
respondents, only “workers” who had 90 percent or greater 
approval ratings were allowed the opportunity to complete 
this survey (Peer, Vosgerau, and Acquisti 2014).
Of the original 763 respondents, the sample was reduced 
to 465 responses by removing those who failed any one of 
two attention check items (e.g., mark “not likely at all”), 
were missing on variables used in the analytic models (<5 
percent), and were nonwhite, given our interest in racial 
resentment and perceptions of white nationalism. Of this 
sample, 37.8 percent were women, 43.4 percent were mar-
ried, 65.8 percent had a college degree or higher, 36.3 per-
cent resided in the South, 26.0 percent identified as 
Republican, 12.0 percent identified as religious fundamen-
talist, and 30.1 percent identified as politically conservative.
Note that an emerging literature documents that results 
from matched opt-in samples (such as our YouGov sample) 
produce results more consistent (i.e., direction and magni-
tude of coefficients) with national probability samples (e.g., 
the General Social Survey) than do nonmatched opt-in sam-
ples (such as our MTurk sample) (see Graham et al. forth-
coming; Thompson and Pickett 2019). Nonetheless, it is 
possible that our use of multi-item scales with strong mea-
surement properties (i.e., α, factor loadings) yield compara-
ble findings between the YouGov and MTurk data, resulting 
in similar factor loadings and coefficients for racial variables 
reported below. Furthermore, on the basis of the ACS white 
population estimates (described earlier), we also estimated 
these models using poststratification weights with the MTurk 
data, again producing similar results. We report the 
unweighted results because the use of models’ predictors to 
develop weights will unnecessarily increase the standard 
errors, thus decreasing the precision of the estimates pro-
duced (Solon, Haider, and Wooldridge 2015; Winship and 
Radbill 1994).
Dependent Variables
Our key dependent variable, faith in Trump, seeks not to 
capture who voted for Trump but those who embrace the 
president because they see him as a special leader. They 
2The YouGov measure of family income included in the core pro-
file items typically has a large number of missing values (n = 77 
in our data) because it includes the response option of “prefer not 
to say.” As a result, to retain the sample size, we omitted family 
income from our main analysis in Table 1. Still, in a supplemen-
tary analysis, we created an economic model that included both full 
employment and income. Neither variable had a significant effect. 
Thus, adding income to the analysis did not substantively alter the 
findings.
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admire his style and strength, his promise to care for them 
and protect them from threats, and his unique ability to 
return the United States to a nation they once cherished. Our 
goal was to select distinctive statements that reflected how 
Trump framed his candidacy to the electorate. Thus, using a 
Likert-type scale (1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly 
agree), respondents in both samples rated their agreement or 
disagreement with five items: (1) “I believe that President 
Trump will make America great again,” (2) “President 
Trump is 100% correct that we need a wall to make sure that 
gang members, criminals, and rapists do not come into the 
U.S.,” (3) “President Trump is the only politician who really 
cares about the common man,” (4) “President Trump knows 
how to protect America against threats from around the 
world,” and (5) “I love President Trump’s style because he 
tells it like it is” (see Table 2). These items appear to differ-
entiate those with and without faith in Trump with high reli-
ability (α = .974) and high factor loadings (between .920 
and .974).
Unique to our MTurk sample, we asked respondents, 
“How willing or unwilling are you to wear a ‘Make 
America Great Again’ (MAGA) hat in public?” Response 
options ranged from 1 = very unwilling to 7 = very will-
ing. This outcome is important because it represents a 
behavioral intention measure of faith in Trump. As noted, 
donning a bright red, easily distinguishable MAGA hat is a 
public expression of affinity for Donald Trump, one he 
encourages (Givhan 2020; see also Crane 2012). Wearing 
a MAGA hat is a “declaration of identity” to in-group 
members (Givhan 2019); it also risks exposing a Trump 
supporter to social exclusion, verbal insult, and even phys-
ical assaults from out-group members (see, e.g., Smith 
2020; Torres 2019). If the findings hold with this depen-
dent variable, it provides added confidence that the factor 
in question has effects that are robust across different ways 
of assessing faith in Trump.
Independent Variables
White nationalism is the key construct in the study. Again, 
this is not a measure of white supremacy or of belonging to a 
formal white racial organization. Consistent with Kaufmann’s 
(2019) use of the concept of ethno-traditional nationalism, 
white nationalism is used to capture the belief that the United 
States should remain culturally and demographically a white 
nation. Building on prior writings, but particularly on 
Kaufmann (2019), we developed a four-item scale to mea-
sure the concept, with responses (see Table 2) ranging from 
1 = strongly agree to 5 = strongly disagree: (1) “The immi-
grants now invading our country—and their liberal support-
ers—want to turn America into a third-world country where 
white people are a tiny minority”; (2) “Although people 
won’t admit it, white people and their culture are what made 
America great in the first place”; (3) “Although everyone is 
welcome in the country, America must remain mostly a white 
nation to remain #1 in the world”; and (4) “We need to reduce 
immigration to keep the U.S. a mostly white nation—which 
is what God meant it to be” (α = .872, factor loadings 
between .813 and .883; see Table 1). All responses were 
recoded so that higher values indicated a greater preference 
for white nationalism.
Aside from white nationalism, an averaged four-item 
scale of racial resentment drawn from Kinder and Sanders 
(1996) asked respondents in both samples to rate their level 
of agreement using a five-point Likert-type scale to state-
ments such as “It’s really a matter of some people not trying 
hard enough; if blacks would only try harder, they could be 
just as well off as whites” (α = .888, factor loadings between 
.856 and .885). Responses were coded such that higher val-
ues indicate greater racial resentment toward blacks. 
Relatedly and confined to the MTurk sample, these items 
were adapted to develop a Hispanic resentment scale to 
reflect animus toward Hispanics, a group that Trump has 
denigrated publicly, using statements such as “Generations 
of discrimination have created conditions that make it diffi-
cult for Hispanics to work their way out of the lower class” 
(α = .887, factor loadings between .887 and .916).
Conversely, a four-item scale of racial sympathy devel-
oped by Chudy (2017) was used to capture white distress 
over black suffering in the YouGov sample. Respondents 
rated their level of sympathy for individuals in four vignettes 
on a five-point Likert-type scale, with higher values indicat-
ing more racial sympathy for the individuals in the vignettes 
(α = .791, factor loadings between .676 and .872). This scale 
was adapted to reflect white distress over Hispanics’ suffer-
ing in the MTurk sample using the same vignettes, but the 
word Hispanic was used in place of black (α = .831; factor 
loadings between .737 and .875).
A key consideration is whether the three racial beliefs are 
empirically distinct. In previous research, Chudy (2017, 
2021) demonstrated that racial sympathy and racial resent-
ment were not simply the opposite ends of the same attitudi-
nal spectrum. Although correlated (r = –.45), they loaded 
on separate factors in factor analysis. Her analysis is pre-
sented in Table 3, and comparable results are found for both 
the YouGov and MTurk surveys. Our study introduces the 
measure for white nationalism, which is positively related to 
racial resentment (r = .576) and negatively related to racial 
sympathy (r = –.465) (see Table 1). The correlation between 
racial resentment and sympathy is –.510. Importantly, in 
both the YouGov and MTurk data, our exploratory factor 
analysis revealed that white nationalism, racial resentment, 
and racial sympathy load onto three separate factors (see 
Table 3). Taken together, these findings suggest that racial 
resentment, racial sympathy, and white nationalism are 
independent constructs whose potential separate effects 
merit examination both in the present analysis and in future 























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































8 Socius: Sociological Research for a Dynamic World 
important measurement advance in the study of racial 
beliefs.
Additionally, views about egalitarianism were identified 
through six items in the YouGov sample that were averaged to 
reflect antisocialist views (e.g., “We have gone too far in push-
ing equal rights in this country”). For a full listing of items, see 
the online Appendix. Respondents indicated their agreement 
or disagreement with these statements on a five-point Likert-
type scale (α = .867, factor loadings between .661 and .829).
Respondents’ fear of crime was measured in the YouGov 
sample through the average response to five items about fear 
of either “you or a member of your household” experiencing 
one of these crimes: someone stealing money or property, 
home break-in, street robbery or mugging, rape or sexual 
Table 2. Faith in Trump, Beliefs in White Nationalism, and MAGA Hat Wearing Responses (%).
TA TD SA A NAD D SD
Faith in Trump (YouGov n = 734)
 I believe that President Trump will make America great again. 43.0 43.8 25.0 18.0 13.2 2.9 40.9
 President Trump is 100% correct that we need a wall to make sure that gang 
members, criminals, and rapists do not come into the U.S.
48.6 41.4 35.4 13.2 10.0 3.9 37.4
 President Trump is the only politician who really cares about the common man 29.6 54.0 15.8 13.8 16.4 10.0 44.1
 President Trump knows how to protect America against threats from around 
the world.
45.3 43.1 21.9 23.4 11.6 4.8 38.3
 I love President Trump’s style because he is strong and tells it like it is. 42.4 46.0 25.1 17.3 11.5 5.1 41.0
White nationalism (YouGov n = 734)
 The immigrants now invading our country—and their liberal supporters—want 
to turn America into a third-world country where white people are a tiny 
minority.
35.9 44.4 18.8 17.1 19.7 8.6 35.8
 Although people won’t admit it, white people and their culture are what made 
America great in the first place.
24.6 50.1 8.5 16.1 25.3 16.7 33.4
 Although everyone is welcome in the country, America must remain mostly a 
white nation to remain #1 in the world.
11.3 69.7 3.7 7.6 18.9 19.4 50.3
 We need to reduce immigration to keep the U.S. a mostly white nation—
which is what God meant it to be.
9.6 70.9 4.7 4.9 19.5 16.8 54.1
MAGA hat wearing (MTurk n = 465) VU U SU NS SW W VW
 How willing or unwilling are you to wear a “Make America Great Again” 
(MAGA) hat in public?
58.7 7.1 5.4 5.4 7.1 6.9 9.5
Note: Percentages may not total to 100 percent, because of rounding. A = somewhat agree; D = somewhat disagree; NAD = neither agree nor disagree; 
NS = not sure; SA = strongly agree; SD = strongly disagree; SU = somewhat unwilling; SW = somewhat willing; TA = total of strongly agree and 
somewhat agree; TD = total of strongly disagree and somewhat disagree; U = unwilling; VU = very unwilling; VW = very willing; W = willing.
Table 3. Comparison of Racial Sympathy and Racial Resentment.
Statistical Properties Chudy Study YouGov Study MTurk Study
Factor Loadings Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
Vignette 1: Laurette—hiring .10 .88 .116 .822 −.194 .118 .823 −.201
Vignette 2: hair salon applicants .05 .86 .105 .851 −.179 .068 .822 −.187
Vignette 3: bus depot −.06 .63 −.140 .722 .228 −.251 .693 .189
Vignette 4: Michael—police −.23 .58 −.354 .588 .063 −.164 .743 .064
Racial resentment—Irish .93 .11 .795 .088 .223 .673 .092 .373
Racial resentment—generations .88 .01 .944 −.043 −.173 .862 −.096 −.112
Racial resentment—try harder .79 −.07 .689 .075 .351 .552 .148 .535
Racial resentment—deserve .84 −.02 .905 −.112 −.196 .869 −.134 −.161
White nationalism—immigrants invading — — .440 .043 .567 .069 −.101 .800
White nationalism—white culture — — .228 −.037 .701 .170 −.015 .795
White nationalism—#1 in the world — — −.132 −.025 .946 −.127 −.023 .958
White nationalism—keep U.S. white nation — — −.148 −.016 .966 −.178 −.020 .969
Explained variance 43% 35% 48.12% 11.99% 13.73% 9.79% 14.44% 60.91%
n 751 734 465
Note: Exploratory factor analyses using promax rotation. Bold variables indicated item loaded on factor. MTurk = Amazon Mechanical Turk.
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assault, and murder. Respondents identified how afraid or 
unafraid of these crimes they were on a five-point Likert-type 
scale (α = .903, factor loadings between .787 and .900). 
Additionally, YouGov respondents reported their beliefs 
about the dangerousness of the world more broadly through 
four items (e.g., “Any day now chaos and anarchy could erupt 
all around us. All signs are pointing to it”; Altemeyer 1988). 
See the online Appendix for exact items. Respondents’ beliefs 
in a dangerous world were captured through agreement or 
disagreement with these statements on a five-point Likert-
type scale (α = .796, factor loadings between .741 and .840).
Given the political divisions within the U.S. geographic 
regions, a dummy variable reflecting those living in the South 
was created for both samples on the basis of respondents’ 
identified state of residence and the U.S. census regions. 
Relatedly, consistent with previous research (see, e.g., King 
and Wheelock 2007; Shelley et al. 2021), political ideology in 
both samples was dummy-coded to reflect those who were 
reportedly conservative or very conservative in order to avoid 
excluding those who were “not sure” about their ideology 
(“not sure” n = 42). Additionally, political party affiliation in 
both samples was dummy-coded to reflect those identifying 
as Republican. Given their central beliefs about the “born 
again” experience (conversion), evangelical Christians were 
identified in the YouGov sample by their affirmative response 
to “Would you describe yourself as a born-again or evangeli-
cal Christian, or not?” (Pew Research Center 2018). In the 
MTurk sample, religious fundamentalists were identified 
through respondents’ describing their religious identity 
(“somewhat well” or “very well”) as “fundamentalist,” “born 
again,” or “evangelical” and/or endorsement that “the Bible 
means exactly what it says. It should be taken literally, word-
for-word,” which is consistent with previous research (Baylor 
Religion Survey 2007; Maxwell and Shields 2019).
Furthermore, all analyses for both samples controlled for 
sociodemographic variables including age (continuously 
measured), sex (1 = female, 0 = male), marital status (1 = 
married, 0 = others), and education (1 = college degree or 
higher, 0 = less than a college degree). Education was coded 
in this way because support for Trump is markedly higher 
among non-college-educated whites (Sides 2017; Sides et al. 
2017). In addition, the YouGov models controlled for being 
a registered voter in 2016 (1 = yes, 0 = no).3
Analytic Strategy
The present analysis was carried out in four steps. First, we 
assess public attitudes toward Trump and white 
nationalism in the YouGov sample descriptively. Second, we 
explore a series of regression models using the YouGov sam-
ple to examine predictors of faith in Trump, with a special 
focus on the effects of racial beliefs. Third, using data from 
the MTurk sample, we explore a series of regression models 
using the MTurk data to assess predictors of faith in Trump, 
largely reproducing the findings from the YouGov data. 
Finally, we examine the MTurk sample’s attitude toward 
Trump using a proxy for faith in Trump: willingness to wear 
a MAGA hat. All regression models were estimated using 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. All variance infla-
tion factors were less than the cutoff of 4.0, which indicates 
no concern with multicollinearity (Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch 
1980; Fox 1991). Ultimately, controlling for a range of vari-
ables, the goal is to address the following question: Are racial 
beliefs, including white nationalism, related to faith in Trump?
Results
Faith in Trump and Support for White 
Nationalism: YouGov Sample
Table 2 reports the extent to which sample members agreed 
or disagreed with the items measuring faith in Trump and 
white nationalism. In describing the results, we present the 
total agree percentage, which includes those answering 
“agree” and “strongly agree.” As seen in Table 2, a substan-
tial minority of respondents agreed with the five items used 
to measure faith in Trump. Nearly half (48.6 percent) of 
respondents agreed that “President Trump is 100% correct 
that we need a wall to make sure that gang members, crimi-
nals, and rapists do not come into the U.S.” More than 4 in 
10 agreed that “President Trump knows how to protect 
America against threats from around the world” (45.3 per-
cent), “I believe that President Trump will make America 
great again” (43.0 percent), and “I love President Trump’s 
style because he tells it like it is” (42.4 percent). Furthermore, 
more than a quarter (29.6 percent) agreed that “President 
Trump is the only politician who really cares about the com-
mon man.”
In addition, the respondents expressed a measure of sup-
port for the four items used to measure white nationalism. 
More than a third (35.9 percent) agreed that “The immigrants 
now invading our country—and their liberal supporters—
want to turn America into a third-world country where white 
people are a tiny minority.” Nearly one in four (24.6 percent) 
endorsed the view that “Although people won’t admit it, 
white people and their culture are what made America great 
in the first place.” In addition, roughly 1 in 10 agreed that 
“Although everyone is welcome in the country, America 
must remain mostly a white nation to remain #1 in the world” 
(11.3 percent) and that “We need to reduce immigration to 
keep the U.S. a mostly white nation—which is what God 
meant it to be” (9.6 percent).
3At the request of a reviewer, YouGov models were estimated with 
the registered voter variable removed from the analysis. Results for 
the impact of white nationalism on faith in Trump were substan-
tively the same. Therefore, this variable was retained to produce a 
more fully specified model.
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Table 4. Ordinary Least Squares Regression Predicting Faith in Trump in the YouGov Sample (n = 734).
Trump Base Model Political Model Crime Salience Model Racial Model
Variable b SE β b SE β b SE β b SE β
Racial beliefs  
 Racial sympathy — — — — — — — — — −.002 .037 −.001
 Racial resentment — — — — — — — — — .225 .042 .165***
 White nationalism — — — — — — — — — .572 .038 .402***
Crime salience  
 Dangerous world — — — — — — .238 .047 .131*** .062 .042 .034
 Fear of crime — — — — — — .125 .040 .079** −.008 .035 −.005
Political  
 Conservative — — — .852 .104 .263*** .821 .101 .253*** .599 .087 .185***
 Antisocialist — — — .648 .047 .392*** .593 .046 .359*** .180 .052 .109***
Trump base and controls
 Age .011 .003 .123*** .001 .002 .014 .002 .002 .019 −.001 .002 −.001
 Female −.282 .091 −.089** −.096 .074 −.030 −.163 .074 −.057* −.038 .063 −.012
 Full-time employment −.010 .102 −.003 −.025 .083 −.008 −.016 .080 −.005 −.015 .068 −.005
 Married .129 .094 .041 .102 .076 .032 .095 .073 .030 .052 .063 .017
 Education −.203 .096 −.064* −.211 .078 −.066** −.117 .076 −.037 .008 .065 .002
 Registered voter −.650 .142 −.135*** −.506 .116 −.105*** −.455 .112 −.094*** −.224 .096 −.046*
 Republican 1.676 .102 .502*** .719 .099 .216*** .681 .096 .204*** .536 .082 .161***
 Reside in South .206 .095 .063* .179 .076 .055* .157 .074 .048* .174 .063 .053**
 Evangelical Christian .645 .106 .187*** .292 .087 .084** .235 .084 .068** .211 .072 .061**
Constant 2.428 .239 — .920 .222 — −.084 .253 — −.183 .284 —
Adjusted R2 .422 .623 .650 .749
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
Table 5. Ordinary Least Squares Regression Predicting Faith in Trump and MAGA Hat Wearing in the Amazon Mechanical Turk 
Sample (n = 465).
Variable
Faith in Trump MAGA Hat Wearing
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
b SE β b SE β b SE β b SE β
Racial beliefs
 Hispanic sympathy .028 .048 .019 — — — .106 .091 .047 — — —
 Hispanic resentment .125 .039 .101** — — — −.025 .073 −.013 — — —
 Racial resentment — — — .214 .039 .180*** — — — .069 .076 .038
 White nationalism .501 .039 .431*** .419 .040 .360*** .665 .074 .375*** .576 .078 .324***
Control variables
 Age .002 .003 .017 .002 .003 .019 .005 .006 .026 .004 .006 .023
 Sex −.103 .075 −.035 −.094 .073 −.032 −.278 .142 −.062 −.255 .142 −.057
 Full-time employment −.071 .086 −.021 −.070 .084 −.021 .351 .163 .069* .347 .163 .068*
 Married .116 .074 .041 .079 .072 .028 .275 .141 .063 .299 .140 .069*
 Education .009 .077 .003 .017 .075 .006 .293 .147 .064* .313 .146 .069*
 Republican .478 .114 .148*** .448 .111 .139*** .403 .217 .082 .322 .215 .065
 Reside in South .079 .073 .027 .078 .071 .026 .087 .138 .019 .091 .138 .020
 Religious fundamentalist .342 .128 .079** .391 .123 .090** .795 .243 .120* .919 .238 .138***
 Conservative 1.025 .113 .332*** .963 .112 .312*** 1.615 .214 .343*** 1.579 .216 .335***
Constant .100 .295 — .186 .168 — −.769 .559 — −.383 .325 —
Adjusted R2 .729 .740 .581 .581
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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Predictors of Faith in Trump: YouGov Sample
Table 4 presents a series of OLS linear regression models, 
each with the theoretical potential to explain faith in Trump. 
As expected in the Trump base model, being a Republican, 
being an evangelical Christian, and residing in the South 
were each significant, with Republican affiliation being the 
strongest predictor (β = .502). The political model intro-
duced conservative political ideology and antisocialist views, 
showing both to be significant predictors of faith in Trump. 
The crime salience model introduces belief in a dangerous 
world and fear of crime, showing these to also be significant 
predictors. Finally, the racial model presents the fully speci-
fied model; key variables from each previous model, with 
the exception of the crime salience model, retain significance 
in the analysis. Thus, all key variables in the Trump base 
model were positively and significantly related to faith in 
Trump (Republican, reside in South, evangelical Christian), 
as were the variables in the political model (conservative, 
antisocialist). Most important, racial beliefs appear conse-
quential. Although racial sympathy was nonsignificant, 
racial resentment and white nationalism were the strongest 
predictors within the analysis, with white nationalism exert-
ing the largest effect (β = .402). This model explained 74.9 
percent of the variation in faith in Trump.
Predictors of Faith in Trump: Supplementary 
MTurk Sample
As seen in Table 5, these multivariate findings regarding 
faith in Trump were largely reproduced using the MTurk 
sample across two models, one with measures of Hispanic 
resentment and sympathy and one with the traditional mea-
sure of racial resentment (toward blacks). In both analyses 
(models 1 and 2), white nationalism was the strongest pre-
dictor of faith in Trump (β = .431 and .360, respectively) 
followed by conservative political ideology (β = .332 and 
.312, respectively). In addition, Republican party affiliation 
and religious fundamentalism were significant predictors 
of faith in Trump. Notably, not only black resentment but 
also Hispanic resentment was associated with great support 
for Donald Trump. Neither black nor Hispanic sympathy 
was significantly related to the outcome variable.
To further test this effect, we used the MTurk sample to 
explicitly assess the willingness to wear a MAGA hat, a 
proxy for faith in Trump. As seen in Table 2, nearly three in 
four (71.2 percent) were either somewhat unwilling, unwill-
ing, or very unwilling to wear this hat. However, a substan-
tive proportion (23.5 percent) expressed a willingness to 
wear this symbol of Trump.
As seen in Table 5, consistent with the previous analyses, 
white nationalism was the most robust predictor (β = .375 
and .324, respectively) of willingness to wear a MAGA hat 
in model 3 (using Hispanic resentment and sympathy) and a 
close second (β = .324) to conservative ideology (β = .335) 
in model 4 (using traditional racial resentment). However, 
neither racial resentment (Hispanic and black) nor Hispanic 
sympathy was statistically significant in either model.
Finally, sensitivity analyses were conducted to assess pos-
sible effects. First, as noted in endnote 1, OLS models were 
estimated that included income and full-time employment. 
These factors were not significant and did not alter the 
results. Second, an interaction effect of racial resentment × 
white nationalism was assessed. The interaction term was 
not significant. Third, nonsignificant results also were found 
for the interaction term of sex × white nationalism. Fourth, 
two of the items in the faith in Trump scale refer to President 
Trump’s building a wall to keep criminals from entering the 
United States and protecting Americans from threats from 
around the world, whereas the white nationalism scale refers 
to the need to reduce immigration in two items. It could be 
argued that the relationship between these two scales is due 
to this overlap. We disagree because one scale asks about 
faith in President Trump to prevent external threats, whereas 
the other scale asks about the impact of immigration on the 
racial composition of the United States. Still, we reestimated 
the multivariate analyses deleting the two items from the 
faith in Trump scale that referenced these external threats. As 
anticipated, white nationalism remained a robust predictor of 
faith in Trump in both the YouGov (model 4, β = .411) and 
MTurk data (model 1, β = .414; model 2, β = .342).
Discussion
As Jardina (forthcoming) emphasized, public support for 
Donald Trump is rooted in his appealing not only to out-
group animus but also to in-group solidarity, a conclusion 
reinforced by the present study. As numerous news accounts 
document, President Trump’s 2020 electoral strategy 
involved openly stoking racial resentment and defending 
white nationalism (see, e.g., Costa and Rucker 2020; Dawsey 
and Stein 2020; Strauss 2020). Recent examples are legion.
In June, he retweeted a supporter filmed “shouting ‘white 
power’ while driving a golf cart bedecked with Trump memo-
rabilia”—later taken down but never condemned (Beggin 
2020). His retweet expressed his gratitude for these “great 
people” supporting him (Swasey 2020). In his July 4 rally at 
Mount Rushmore, he “excoriated racial justice protesters as 
‘evil’ representatives of a ‘new far-left fascism’ whose ulti-
mate goal is ‘the end of America’” (Costa and Rucker 2020). 
Echoing this animus, he has termed BLM as a “symbol of 
hate,” called protesters of police violence “thugs,” and labeled 
antiracism rallies “domestic terror” (Beggin 2020). In his trip 
to Kenosha, Wisconsin, he refused to meet with Jacob Blake, 
the African American man shot by a police officer, and 
defended Kyle Rittenhouse, a white teenager who traveled 
from Illinois to Kenosha, where he now stands accused of 
murdering two people with an AR-15-type weapon (Schechter 
2020; Wise 2020). When asked about systemic racism, Trump 
said, “I don’t believe in that” (Lizza 2020).
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He soon followed up by directing Russell Vought, Office of 
Management and Budget head, to cancel all federal govern-
ment racial sensitivity training based on “critical race theory” 
and notions of “white privilege” (Dawsey and Stein 2020). 
Vought’s (2020) memorandum stated that the president 
believed that these programs “undercut our core values as 
Americans” and are “divisive, un-American propaganda.” 
Echoing the same theme, President Trump then attacked the 
educational 1619 Project, which reframes American history 
through the lens of slavery and the enduring antiblack animus 
it promoted. Arguing that “teaching this doctrine to our chil-
dren is a form of child abuse in the truest sense of those 
words,” he created the 1776 Commission to develop a patri-
otic, “pro-American curriculum that celebrates the truth about 
our nation’s great history” (Watson and Segers 2020). Pollster 
Cornell Belcher captured the moment. “Without white resent-
ment, there is no rationale for Donald Trump. . . . Without that, 
what reason do his supporters have to be with Donald Trump 
if he’s not going to be your tribal strong man? He started there 
and will end there” (quoted in Costa and Rucker 2020).
In this context, we explored “who wears the MAGA hat” in 
multiple models using two different white samples, numerous 
potential predictors, and a measure of faith in Trump, supple-
mented with a specific question on willingness to don a 
MAGA hat. The findings reveal that faith in Trump is not fully 
contingent on racial attitudes. Allegiance to the president is 
also derived from his presumed base of Republicans, those liv-
ing in the South, and evangelical or fundamentalist Christians. 
Such support is bolstered as well by those with conservative 
political ideology and antisocialist beliefs. However, contrary 
to our hypothesized model, crime salience was not associated 
with faith in Trump in the model, including all predictor vari-
ables. The important point, however, is that even with controls 
for these political and social variables, racial beliefs of whites 
matter and are likely integral to understanding the intense loy-
alty of the president’s white followers.
Consistent with academic research and popular commen-
tary, racial resentment was a significant predictor in all mod-
els with faith in Trump as the dependent variable (see Tables 4 
and 5). Notably, this effect is demonstrated using the stan-
dard Kinder and Sanders (1996) measure of racial resent-
ment and using an adaptation of this scale to assess Hispanic 
resentment. Future research should explore this finding on 
types of racial resentment. As a side note, Chudy (2017, 
forthcoming) argued that racial sympathy is activated when a 
policy is specifically relevant to African Americans (e.g., 
support for affirmative action, sentencing of a black criminal 
defendant). Given Trump’s racially charged rhetoric, it 
seemed plausible that racial sympathy might evoke less sup-
port for the president. This was not the case. Racial sympathy 
might be activated if respondents were asked about race-
specific actions by the president, such as his criticism of 
BLM or canceling federal racial sensitivity training, but this 
remains to be demonstrated.
The importance of the contributions of Jardina (2019b, 
forthcoming) and Kaufmann (2019), and the ethnographic 
work of Hochschild (2016; see also Kimmel 2013), is that 
these works push social science to move beyond an over-
concentration on out-group racial animus to consider in-
group racial solidarity. Racial resentment remains a robust 
predictor essential to any quantitative study, but it is not the 
only racial attitude that has political consequences. These 
revisionist authors argue that increasing diversity, seen in 
both cultural and demographic trends, is fueling the creation 
of a group identity and consciousness among a sizable 
minority of whites (Jardina 2019b, forthcoming). These 
views cannot be reduced to white hatred and supremacy. 
Jardina speaks of white identity and consciousness and 
Kaufmann (2019) of ethno-traditional nationalism. We 
believe that the concept of “white nationalism” is parsimo-
nious, describes beliefs about keeping the United States 
white accurately, and has intuitive appeal. Regardless of the 
label settled upon, future research on the effects of racial 
beliefs will benefit from including this factor in the analy-
ses. The contemporary reality is that political allegiances 
and public policy preferences are shaped not only by what 
whites think about blacks but also by what whites think 
about themselves.
In this regard, Jardina’s (2019b, forthcoming) work is sig-
nificant because it demonstrates empirically that white iden-
tity and consciousness predict warm feelings toward and a 
voting preference for Donald Trump. We build on her find-
ings in two ways. First, methodologically, we confirm that 
measures of whiteness—in this case, white nationalism—are 
conceptually and empirically distinct from other racial 
beliefs, such as resentment and sympathy. Second, substan-
tively, we show that white nationalism is a consistent and 
robust predictor of faith in Trump for white Americans. This 
association is initially demonstrated in the main analysis 
with the YouGov sample. With an independent sample, we 
then reproduce these results with MTurk data and proceed to 
establish that white nationalism also is related to willingness 
to wear a MAGA hat—again a behavioral expression of 
identity fusion with the president (Kunst et al. 2019). A sea 
of whites donning MAGA hats at campaign rallies thus 
seems due not only to the Trump camp’s marketing prowess 
but also to his follows’ desire to display faith in their man.
Taken together with Jardina’s (2019b, forthcoming) 
research, the present study appears to confirm what these 
observations of Trump campaign rallies suggest: race is inte-
gral to his popularity and electoral success among whites. 
Trump’s genius was in understanding that many white 
Americans felt like strangers in their own land, to use 
Hochschild’s (2016) poignant phrase. “Radical Islamists” 
and “bad hombres” as well as proposed bans and walls, were 
convenient conduits to communicate that he was on their 
side in the culture wars devaluing them and their social 
standing. The use of the MAGA acronym communicated that 
he was going to make their America great again by slowing 
demographic change and by defending the symbols of white-
ness. Trump’s “racialized political narratives,” noted Fording 
and Schram (2020), “helped make his campaign slogan to 
Graham et al. 13
‘Make America Great Again’ easily be decoded to mean we 
need to ‘Make American White Again’” (p. 40). He promised 
to be their champion, and they responded with faith in Trump. 
He reaffirmed their status and served their emotional inter-
ests (Hochschild 2016).
Two issues remain to be determined. First, Trump’s 2020 
campaign focused less on “dangerous” out-groups—
Muslims and Mexicans—and more on animus toward 
African American (BLM) protesters. In the aftermath of the 
George Floyd incident and rising concern over racial justice 
(Eligon 2020), it is unclear if this political strategy will 
increase or erode faith in Trump. The recent presidential 
election, however, likely did little to suggest a decline in 
Trump’s popularity or to provide any incentive from him to 
change his political strategy. Although losing to Biden, 
Trump amassed more than 74.2 million votes—the second 
highest total historically (to Biden’s 81.3 million votes), 
including 95 percent of all Republicans and 58 percent of all 
white voters. These figures are similar to or higher than in 
the 2016 election; Trump even increased his support in 2020 
among people of color. Young Americans constitute one 
crack in this wall of support. Exit polls report that nearly 
two thirds of those ages 18 to 24 (65 percent) cast their vote 
for Biden (CNN 2016, 2020). This generational gap in 
Trump support may dim the prospect of Trumpism, if not 
now, perhaps in the future.
Second, in the post-Trump era, it is unclear whether white 
in-group solidarity will grow and intensify or attenuate as 
cultural and demographic diversity become an unstoppable 
development (Jones 2016). It also remains to be seen if poli-
ticians within the Republican Party will continue to attempt 
to capitalize on racial resentment and white nationalism. 
Donald Trump shows no signs of receding into the dustbin of 
defeated presidential candidates, holding out the promise of 
a presidential run in 2024 and threatening to punish any poli-
tician who does not show sufficient loyalty to him, including 
in his doomed attempt to retain his office. Trump endures as 
the elephant in the Republican room. “Republicans should 
wake up,” observed Rubin (2020). “A sizable segment of 
‘their’ base is not theirs at all. Those voters are the ones in 
red hats hollering that the election was stolen” (see also 
Thompson 2020). Indeed, commentators are holding a 
requiem for the establishment GOP, noting that the party of 
Lincoln is now owned by Trump (The Editorial Board 2020). 
According to the New York Times, the party “allowed itself to 
be co-opted by Trumpism. Its ideology has been reduced to a 
slurry of paranoia, white grievance and authoritarian popu-
lism” (The Editorial Board 2020). Republican presidential 
hopefuls are not running away from these sentiments but are 
embracing Trumpism and its emphasis on white working-
class resentment toward liberal “socialism,” efforts to 
“defund the police,” and talk of “systemic racism” (see 
Waldman 2020). Still, central questions remain: Will whites 
with this inclination wear MAGA hats for other candidates, 
or is their faith in the president a historical quirk unique to 
Donald Trump? And what role will be played by racial 
beliefs, including white nationalism, in shaping such politi-
cal allegiances?
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